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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 53 APRIL 1955 No. 6 
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF 
FEDERAL CONTRACTS 
Arthur S. Miller* 
ONE result of the recent tremendous increase in national govern-mental activities is the growth in importance of federal pur-
chases. Emerging from a relatively insignificant position, those pur-
chases are today one of the most important national economic factors.1 
Purchases by the military establishment alone have a far-reaching effect 
on the national economy. "For over a decade, military appropriations 
and expenditures have been the principal exogenous factors affecting 
the levels of employment, output, and expenditure in the economy," an 
economist observed in 1951.2 And with the enhanced importance of 
federal procurement, the technique of purchase-the government con-
tract-has taken on a highly significant role. Not only are large 
segments of American business dependent, at least in part, on the award 
of federal contracts for their very livelihood, but the government con-
tract has been frequently utilized as an instrument of social control.3 
Federal contracts thus have both a buying and a social function; and 
it seems to be entirely accurate to characterize them as "an institution 
playing a major part in the economic, social, and political life of the 
nation .... "4 
" Assistant Professor, Emory Univexsity Law School.-Ed. 
1 Compare a recent statement of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt: " ••• [F]ederal 
purchases are coming to dominate the national economy. Of our gross national product in 
1929 of $103.8 billion, purchases of goods and services by state and local governments 
accounted for 6.9%, the federal government merely 1.3%; but of our $327.8 billion of 
gross national product in 1951 the state and local governments accounted for only 6%, the 
federal government 12.7%. In other words, in the span of 22 years the direct effect of 
purchases by state and local governments fell off about 14%, while that of the federal 
government mounted almost 1000%." V A:NDERllILT, THE DoCTlllNE OP nm Sl!.eAllA'IION 
oP POWERS AND !Ts PRBsENT·DAY SIGNIFICANCE 64 (1953). 
2 J. P. Miller, "Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42 AM.. 
EcoN. Rav., PAPERS AND PnoCl!l!DINGS, No. 2, p. 453 (May 1952). 
3 For a discussion, see the present writer's recent article, Miller, "Government Con-
tracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry," 41 VA. L. Rav. 27 (1955). 
4 Braucher, Book Review, 3 J. Pan. L. 247 at 248 (1954). 
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If what has been said has any validity, then it becomes important 
to determine the basic principles governing award of those contracts. 
Of particular importance is the extent to which the government is free 
to choose those with whom it will contract. For the social and eco-
nomic importance of federal purchases generally and the dependence 
of many :6.rms on government business in order to stay :financially 
viable would seem to require that award of contracts should not be left 
to the whim or uncontrolled discretion of procurement officers. This 
article will discuss aspects of contract award by federal procurement 
officials, attention being given both to the general question of freedom 
of procurement officers to choose or reject :6.rms as potential contractors 
and to the specific question of the power of the procurement agencies 
to "blacklist" certain business concerns. Since the military establish-
ment is the largest purchaser and also has the most detailed set of 
procurement regulations, references to practices and procedures of the 
government will be to those followed by the Department of Defense, 
unless otherwise noted. 
To place the government contract in its proper perspective, it may 
be well at the outset to sketch briefly certain developments in private 
contracting. The very essence of traditional contracting between 
private individuals is that an individual has freedom of choice in mak-
ing an agreement. The core of contract, at least historically, is that 
one may choose the other party with whom he deals and, at the same 
time, has a large area of maneuver in which dickering over terms may 
take place.5 
That concept must now be qualified. For little doubt exists that 
there is a large difference between contract law in theory and as it ap-
pears in the textbooks and the ''agreement process" as it actually op-
erates in the community.6 The consensual nature of "agreement" be-
comes, on realistic analysis, something other than consent in important 
areas where contract is used. In those areas, the act of consent is not 
to terms bargained over and agreed to by equals. It is an act of sub-
mission to one in a superior position. The relationship between the 
parties, thus, is often one of power, not contract in its traditional sense. 
In many of the transactions between individuals in society, it is ap-
5 Compare this statement: " ••• [t]he two primary aspects of liberty of contract [are] 
(1) there can be no contracts by compulsion, and (2) the parties are free as to the content 
of their contracts." K:sssLl!R AND SHARP, CoNTRACTs: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (1953). 
6 It has been noted that there is "a pathetic contrast between the law of contract as it 
is taught in most textbooks, and modern contract as it functions in society." FmEDMANN, 
LAw AND SocrAL CHANGE IN CoNTEMPORARY BRITAIN 34 (1951). 
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parent that freedom of choice has been significantly narrowed, so much 
so that often the choice one has is not between alternative means to 
attain an end or to fulfill a desire. Rather, the choice is to contract in 
a standardized "no bargaining" atmosphere or not to contract at all. 
While it is usually possible to select the other party (although this is 
not always true), under many agreements which the law calls "con-
tracts" there is no bargaining, no dickering over terms. Freedom of 
choice has thus degenerated to the freedom to choose from among those 
able to exert a dominating power from a superior bargaining position. 
All of this is illustrated by the fact that many s~alled contracts 
h b " uI " " d di d" h b " ave ecome comp sory or stan ar ze or ave ecome con-
tracts of adhesion."7 Examples where individual choice plays little 
or no part are easily found: in insurance agreements, in conditional 
sales, in public utility sales, in collective bargaining agreements (here 
the individual worker has given up his bargaining to the more power-
ful group, the union). American law subsumes these and similar 
agreements under the generic term "contract," but the relationship, 
again, is not that, but one of power involving an act of submission.8 
Traditional contract law still speaks in terms of private volition, of 
complete freedom of choice. But in actual operation, something quite 
different often appears in the form of "a counterprinciple of control 
over private volition."9 Not entirely, of course, for as Roscoe Pound 
has pointed out, 'We have gone no further in America than supple-
menting the law of contracts. We have not wholly discarded it."10 
This development has significance as a background against which 
the government contract may be viewed. For it has often been stated 
7 For discussions of the various aspects of the changing nature of contracts, see Isaacs, 
''The Standardizing of Contracts," 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Pound, ''The New Feudal-
ism," 16 A.B.A.J. 553 (1930); Lenhoff, "The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper," 43 
CoL. L. REv. 586 (1943); Patterson, "Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball," 43 CoL. 
L. REv. 731 (1943); Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom 
of Contract," 43 CoL. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?-An Essay 
in Perspective," 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Kahn-Freund, Introduction, in RENNER, THB 
INsnTanoNs oP PRIVATE LAw AND THEIR SoCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949). 
It may be well to indicate that the point to be noted here is not that increasing 
standardization of contracts is either "good" or "bad" per se, but the fact that modem 
transactions called "contracts" often vary significantly from what was traditionally viewed 
as contractual agreements. The modern agreement, even if standardized, is certainly a con-
venient and perhaps a necessary method of operating in an industrial society. Cf. CoHBN, 
LAw AND THE SoCIAL ORDER 107 et seq. (1933). 
8 Cf. Kahn-Freund, Introduction, in RENNER, THE INsnTanoNs op PRIVATE LAw 
AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949). 
9 KBssLBR AND SHARP, CoNTRAcrrs: CASES AND MATERIALS 36-37 (1953). 
10 Pound, ''The Rule of Law and the Modern Social Welfare State," 7 V AND. L. REv. 
1 at 8 (1953). 
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by courts that the contracts of the federal government are to be con-
strued and interpreted in accordance with the same principles as those 
controlling contracts between private individuals. An example of this 
came in 1947 when the United States Supreme Court said: "It is 
customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to 
apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of 
general contract law."11 (Just what "general contract law" means 
was left unsaid by the majority of the Court. However, Justice Black, 
in dissenting, made much of the ambiguous nature of the term.) In 
1954 the Court of Claims reaffirmed that position in this fashion: 
" ... In the absence of some applicable federal statute to the contrary, 
the Government, when it contracts with its citizens, subjects itself to 
the same rules of law that govern private individuals."12 Such broad 
statements leave much to be desired and, in fact, do little to solve 
knotty problems in the construction of federal contracts. But the quoted 
statements are typical and serve to point up some basis for comparing 
those contracts with those of private individuals. 
The basic principles guiding government procurement are set out 
in legislation enacted by Congress over the years, in court decisions, 
and in administrative decisions ( chiefly those of the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States). For the military departments, the Armed 
Services Procurement Act of 194?13 is the chief legislative statement, 
although other statutes have importance in relatively limited areas. 
For the other procurement agencies, no such systematic statutory state-
ment has been made. Their procedures are governed, so far as Con-
gress is concerned, by a series of relatively helter-skelter enactments, 
chieB.y Revised Statute 3709.14 In addition, the General Services Ad-
ministration has been invested with authority to prescribe rules and 
regulations governing procurement by the nonmilitary agencies.16 Court 
decisions, principally those of the Court of Claims and the lower fed-
11Priebe 8c Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 at 411, 68 S.Ct. 123 (1947). 
Compare United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 at 66 (1876): "The United States, when 
they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizens 
in that behalf." 
12 Hughes Transportation, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 212 at 
228. . · 
13 62 Stat. L. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §151 et seq. 
14 Originally enacted in 1861, the present statute is set out in 41 U.S.C. (1952) §5, 
the pertinent part of which reads as follows: "Unless otherwise provided in the appropria-
tion concerned or other law, purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the Govern-
ment may be made ••• only after advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals .••• " 
lli Pursuant to §201 of the Federal Property and Administrative Service Acts of 1949, 
63 Stat. L. 383 (1949), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §481. 
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eral courts, also play an important part. But the judicial role is over-
shadowed in this area by the General Accounting Office, which has 
built on its statutory mandate with the result that it has become the 
most pervasive influence on the procuring agencies.16 
Whatever law is applied by courts and agencies c~nstruing gov-
ernment contracts, it is clear that the national government, while con-
tracting, operates from a superior bargaining position. This enables it 
to impose its desires, to a large extent at least, upon its contractors. The 
"agreement" process in contracting with the federal government is only 
partially consensual. Significant aspects of the agreements are repre-
sentative of an act of submission to the superior power of the govern-
ment. In like fashion, then, to many contracts between private indi-
viduals, contracts of the United States usually contain major areas 
where the agreement is purely nonconsensual. No bargaining takes 
place, for example, over such contract clauses as that imposing mini-
mum labor standards on the contractor or that requiring him to "buy 
American" or that giving the government a unilateral right of termi-
nation.17 The principal area of maneuver, in which some dickering 
may take place, is in the price field, and the determination of the firm 
to get the award usually involves price considerations to the exclusion 
of other factors.18 ("Sole source" situations may alter that statement to 
the extent that the government may be willing to bend and alter normal 
procedures if a contractor, who is the only source of some required item, 
is obdurate and refuses to take the contract unless those procedures are 
changed to his liking. To that extent, a "sole source" reverses the 
normal situation and approaches the government at least on an equal 
plane, if not from a superior position. Power being roughly equal, the 
sole source may force desired modifications in terms and conditions 
imposed upon other contractors not so fortunately situated.) 
16 The main apparent aim of the Comptroller General is that of saving money for the 
government. But the activities of the General Accounting Office may have their unfortu-
nate results. "While the General Accounting Office has without doubt done much to 
insure care and honesty upon the part of federal purchasing agencies and industry, the 
rulings of the Comptroller General have often interfer~d with expeditious and efficient 
purchasing practices." J. P. Mir.um, Pru:CING OP Mn.rrARY PnoctJRBMBNTS 29 (1949). 
See also, Ramey and Erlewine, "Mistakes and Bailouts of Suppliers under Government 
Contracts and Subcontracts-A Study of Doctrine, Practice and Adhesions," 39 CoBN. 
L.Q. 634 (1954). 
17 For a general discussion of contract clauses in government contracts, see LUPTON, 
GoVERNMENT CoNT.RACTS SIMPLIFIED, c. 5 (1953). Risik, ''Federal Government Contract 
Clauses and Forms,'' 23 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 125 (1954). 
18 This is true in the case of "negotiated" as well as "advertised" procurements, but 
more so in the latter type. 
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For our present purposes, the point to be seen is that while this 
article is inquiring into the question of choice of contractor, the gov-
ernment is largely in control of the other chief attribute of traditional 
liberty of contract: the terms and conditions of the contract itself. We 
may thus summarize a first conclusion in the inquiry under consid-
eration in this manner: the government is under no restraint as to many 
of the terms and conditions of its contracts and may impose those con-
ditions it deems necessary. These are imposed as a result of a statute 
(an example of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act) or an execu-
tive order (for example, the nondiscrimination in employment clause) 
or administrative regulation ( one of the more important is that allow-
ing termination of the contract for "convenience of the government''). 
The Supreme Court has furnished explicit support for that conclusion: 
"Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the 
unrestricted power . . . to :6x the terms and conditions upon which it 
will make needed purchases."19 What limitations, if any, exist as to 
choice of contractor by federal procurement agencies? This half of the 
traditional liberty of contract concept is not so easily answered. 
I. A BmnER MusT BE "RESPONSIBLE" 
One way of looking at the question under inquiry is to ask this 
question: when, and under what circumstances, may a contracting 
officer refuse to do business with a particular firm? A complete answer 
to that question should reveal the fundamental principles governing 
choice of contractor by the government. 
At the outset it should be noted that Congress has insisted that it 
be a fundamental proposition of government purchasing that compe-
tition be obtained, if at all possible, before award of a contract. This 
principle finds expression, for example, in the Armed Services Procure-
ment Act of 1947, section 3(a) of which directs that the basic method 
of procurement is that of formally advertising the proposed purchase. 
Under this system sealed bids are received and award made to the low-
est responsible bidder. The advertising is to be conducted in a manner 
which will permit "full and free competition ... consistent with the 
procurement of types of supplies and services necessary to meet . 
• "20 reqmrements .... 
19 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 at 127, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940). The 
present status of this case may be doubtful. See discussion on pp. 803-804 infra. 
20 62 Stat. L. 22-23 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l52(a). 
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Congress, however, made provision for procurement without use 
of the sealed bid system by allowing use of the relatively informal 
"negotiation" procedure in specific instances. In seventeen exceptions 
set out in the Armed Services Procurement Act, formal advertising need 
not be utilized. The key exception here is that in section 2(c)(l), 
allowing blanket use of negotiation techniques in times of national 
emergency. In effect a word of art, negotiation is perhaps best defin-
able as the procedure followed when contracts are awarded after less 
formalized methods; greater flexibility is possible since the stringent 
requirements which have developed in formal advertising need not be 
followed. 
Inherent inadequacies in the formal bid system21 plus the presi-
dential declaration of national emergency in December 1950, which 
allowed blanket use of section 2(c)(l), has resulted in the great major-
ity of military contracts since 1950 being awarded after negotiation.22 
To a large extent, the congressional mandate in this regard has been 
superseded by administrative determination. The act contemplates that 
the great volume of purchases would be made under the sealed bid 
system. Probably Congress did not visualize that the emergency de-
clared following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea would continue 
in effect long after the cessation of combat. Probably, also, the short-
comings of the formal bid system will continue to result in the wide-
spread use of negotiation with its greater flexibility and capacity for 
use in any situation. 
While different stricter rules and regulations apply for the award 
of contracts under formal advertising procedures than for those awarded 
following negotiation techniques, for present purposes no differentia-
tion need be made. The question under inquiry may be developed 
and conclusions drawn without regard to the procedure followed.23 
A second conclusion may be stated in this fashion: a -firm must be 
a responsible bidder in order to receive award of a federal contract. 
21 See J. P. Miller, ''Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42 
AM.. EcoN. REv., Papers and Proceedings, No. 2, p. 453 (May 1952). 
22 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, for example, the Department of Defense 
entered into 2,792,473 procurement actions within the United States. Of these, 2,590,345 
were negotiated (92.8%) and 202,128 (7.2%) were advertised. The net value of military 
prime contracts awarded in the same period within the United States was $11.7 billion, 
of which $9.9 billion represented negotiated contracts and $1.8 billion advertised contracts. 
See Report of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) entitled: "Military 
Prime Contracts with Small Business," dated 27 October 1954. 
23 And it makes no difference for the present discussion that the final contract may 
be "fixed price," "cost-plus-fixed-fee," or whatever other type is decided upon by the 
procurement officials. 
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Military contracts, by statute, are to be made to that "responsible bidder 
whose bid ... will be most advantageous to the Government, price and 
other factors considered .... "24 That is a statutory requirement of 
what had been case law.25 
Who, then, is a responsible bidder? It has been said that the term 
"responsible" means "something more than pecuniary ability; it includes 
also judgment, skill, ability, capacity and integrity."26 This statement 
of the criteria of responsibility finds similar expression in the adminis-
trative regulations implementing the Armed Services Procurement Act. 
Paragraphs 2-406. I and 1-307 of the Armed Services Procurement Reg-
ulation (ASPR) indicate ·that the matters to be considered in deciding 
whether a potential supplier is responsible include (a) the status of the 
bidder as a manufacturer or regular dealer, (b) financial responsibility, 
(c) skill and experience, and (d) prior conduct and performance.27 
Decision as to who is or is not a responsible bidder is made by the 
individual procurement officer, operating under internal administrative 
directives issued by the agency whose employee he is. To aid that 
officer in making that determination, it is not unusual for a so-called 
"business clearance" or "facility capability report" to be made. Manda-
tory for military buying, under such a procedure the firm in question 
is surveyed by a team of experts and its capacity to produce analyzed. 
A judgment is then made of its ability to perform the proposed contract 
in the required time and in consonance with the desired quality stand-
ards. Failure to meet any of the criteria for responsibility will normally 
result in the denial of a contract, even in those cases where the firm 
in question has submitted the lowest price. This foreknowledge is an 
24 62 Stat. L. 23 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l52(b). 
25 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Carney, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761; Scott v. United 
States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909); 20 Comp. Gen. 862 (1941). "The question whether a 
particular bidder is a 'responsible bidder' requires sound business judgment, and involves 
an evaluation of the bidder's experience, facilities, technical organization, reputation, finan. 
cial resources, and other factors." S. Rep. 571, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1947), reprinted in 
2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1048 at 1064 (1948). 
26 O'Brien v. Carney, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761 at 762. 
27 The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (hereinafter cited ASPR) is pub-
lished in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. Both of those sources 
are usually months in arrears. A handier, though unofficial, source which keeps up-to-date 
with new developments is CCH, G017ernment Contracts Reporter, a loose-leaf service. 
Paragraph 2-406.1 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation appears at 32 C.F.R. 
§400 (1952), IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAC'I'S REP. ,r29,086 (1954). 
ASPR 2-406.3 lists the following as other factors besides price that may be considered 
in making an award: judgment, skill, and integrity of a bidder; reputation and experience 
of a bidder; foreseeable costs or delays attributable to differences in manufacturing methods; 
changes requested by the bidder; restrictions or conditions imposed in the bid; and possible 
advantages that might result from making multiple awards. 
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educated guess of capability; it provides the basis for the elimination of 
certain £rms from consideration for contract award. That determina-
tion, however, is often difficult to make. 
The criterion of manufacturer or regular dealer probably causes 
least trouble. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act contains a 
similar provision which limits award of contracts for supplies over 
$10,000 in amount to manufacturers or regular dealers. Under that 
statute the Secretary of Labor regularly issues determinations that cer-
tain £rms do not meet the standards to qualify as either. The job of 
the procurement officer is simplified since, for most purposes at least, he 
need only check the list of firms so designated by the Secretary of 
Labor.28 
But more difficulty is involved in cases of alleged £nancial inade-
quacy. Ways exist to cure some such inadequacies. While it is cer~ 
tainly not desirable to award a contract to a firm lacking sufficient £nan-
cial resources to complete it, still the cost to the government may be 
significantly increased if award is made to other than the lowest bidder. 
An additional judgment thus is in order: will alternative procedures, 
such as the requirement of a performance bond, adequately protect the 
interests of the government? If so, then perhaps the £nancial weakness 
should be waived.29 But performance bonds do not, if default is made, 
give delivery of the desired items; for the military at least, this is often 
all-important. In that case, the procurement officer will often explore 
the possibility of government financing, particularly along the line of 
progress payments or advance payments, and thus curing the firm's 
financial troubles.30 A government-sponsored loan is another possibil-
ity, one made, for example, by the Small Business Administration.31 
For major prime contractors, such as large airplane manufacturers, still 
other £nancial arrangements may be made. 32 
28 See LUPTON, GoVERNMENT CoNTRAcrs SIM.P.LIFllID 195, 299 (1953) for a brief 
discussion of the manufacturer-regular dealer requirement. And see 10 Comp. Gen. 314 
(1931) for a ruling that "advertisements for supplies ••• may properly limit competition 
to manufacturers of, or regular dealers in, such supplies. • • ." Definitions of the Secretary 
of Labor of manufacturers and regular dealers may be found in 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 
1126,200 (1953). 
29 Cf. 6 Comp. Gen. 557 (1927); 13 Comp. Gen. 274 (1934). 
so See 18 Comp. Gen. 330 (1938). 
SlAuthorized in the Small Business Act of 1953, 67 Stat. L. 233, 15 U.S.C. (Supp. 
I, 1954) §§631-633. 
82 For a description of one such financial arrangement, see Cary, "Government Financ-
ing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of the Glenn L. Martin Company," 66 
HARV. L. R.Bv. 834 (1953). 
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Over that hurdle, the element of skill and experience still causes 
major difficulty. Here, as in cases of :financial irresponsibility, the 
nature and magnitude of the subject matter of the contract may be an 
important consideration. Contracts for research and development and 
for items of technological complexity must go to those companies which 
have demonstrated their ability to do the required work. But perform-
ance bonds can be used to protect against nonperformance in the rou-
tine procurement. The result is that except in contracts involving un-
usual technical skills, little authority exists for further limiting com-
petition by eliminating firms under this criterion. 33 The interest of 
obtaining needed supplies at the most economical price will outweigh 
lack of previous experience in most, if not all, contracts involving work 
not calling for unusual skills.34 Again, however, the military services 
are not interested in recovery under performance bonds; rather, they 
desire the timely delivery of needed equipment. 
Past unsatisfactory service by a contractor will not ordinarily be 
considered adequate cause for the rejection of a low bid fro:r,n an other-
wise responsible bidder. A default, for example, on a previous contract 
will not allow refusal of the award of a new contract.35 On the other 
hand, repeated failures to perform or repeated attempts to avoid proper 
performance of work may serve to justify rejection of the lowest bid.36 
And a bidder's reputation and his ethics may be grounds for refusing 
to do business with him.37 
In broad general terms the foregoing outline develops the require-
ment of responsibility for a firm to be eligible to receive a federal con-
tract. One additional question is of interest in that connection: to what 
extent, if at all, is administrative discretion in determining the lowest 
responsible bidder subject to judicial review? Discussion of this ques-
33 See 6 Comp. Gen. 210 (1926); 6 Comp. Gen. 557 (1927); 20 Comp. Gen. 862 
(1941); 30 Comp. Gen. 235 "(1950). 
34 See 14 Comp. Gen. 305· (1934); 8 Comp. Gen. 252 (1928); 7 Comp. Gen. 181 
(1927). Cf. 27 Comp. Gen. 343 (1947). · 
35 Cf. 25 Comp. Gen. 859 (1946); and see 7 Comp. Gen. 547 (1928); l Comp. 
Gen. 304 (1921). 
36 See Comp. Gen. Dec. A-70057 (Feb. 1, 1936) (unpublished). See, also, ASPR 
1-604.1, allowing debarment of a bidder for a history of failure to perform or of unsatis-
factory performance on one or more contracts. IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP. 
,r29,049E (1955). 
37 The Facility Capability Report of the Air Force is an example. One of the ques-
tions to be answered by the survey team is: Are the business practices of the firm consid-
ered satisfactory insofar as is known or can be determined without benefit of a complete 
investigation? See DEPT. 011 THE Am FonCE, Am FonCE PnoctmllMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
,r52-103 (1954). 
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tion will be undertaken more fully below; suffice it at this time to say 
that an extremely broad discretion is exercised by the buying agency 
in the determination and that that discretion has not as yet been subject-
ed to judicial second-guessing. This coincides with the apparent congres-
sional intent.38 Some relief may be available, however, to a disap-
pointed bidder in the form of a protest lodged with the Comptroller 
General. That official will entertain a protest against award and make 
a decision as to the propriety of the rejection of complainant's bid.89 
II. SoME OTHER FACTORS LIMITING COMPETITION 
Many other considerations go into the award of military contracts. 
For example, the procurement officer usually must buy from a domestic, 
i.e., American, £rm to the exclusion of a foreign bidder ( or an Ameri-
can import firm handling foreign-made products) unless the prices of 
the domestic firms are clearly unreasonable.4° Congress has often stated 
its policy of insuring that small business obtain a fair share of govern-
ment spending; in some instances, thus, a firm termed "big" will be 
denied an opportunity to get a contract.41 Geographical areas where a 
condition of substantial unemployment exists may be favored under 
Defense Manpower Policy No. 4, with the result that firms in those 
areas will be awarded contracts provided that they can meet the price 
of firms from outside those areas.42 Dispersal of industry, the desira-
bility of developing additional sources for the production of critical 
items, and the avoidance of concentration of contracts in a few sup-
pliers are other policies which may, in particular instances, serve to 
limit competition.43 
ss See O'Brien v. Camey, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761; Walter P. Villere Co. 
v. Blinn, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 914. 
89 See 32 Comp. Gen. 251 (1952); 16 Comp. Gen. 497 (1936); 13 Comp. Gen. 315 
(1934). 
40Required by the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. L. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 
U.S.C. (1952) §§l0a-d, and other legislation incorporating the anti-foreign principle. 
Section VI of the ASPR contains a statement of the prohibitions. See IA CCH, Govr. 
CoNTRA.CTS REP. ,m29,300 to 29,323 (1954). See also 30 Comp. Gen. 384 (1951). 
41An example is §2(b) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, a portion 
of which reads as follows: ''It is the declared policy of the Congress that a fair proportion 
of the total purchases and contracts . • • for the Government shall be placed with small 
business concerns." 62 Stat. L. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l5I(b). See 31 Comp. 
Gen. 347 (1952); 30 Comp. Gen. 441 (1951); 28 Comp. Gen. 662 (1949). 
42Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 was promulgated February 7, 1952. 17 FED. 
REG. 1195 (1952). For the present form of the policy and its implementation, see 1 CCH, 
Govr. CoNTRACTS REP. ,i2261. 
43 On December 7, 1954, the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to 
procure equipment and supplies in .accordance with the following criteria:· (a) maintaining 
multiple sources of supply; (b) geographic ruspersal; (c) avoidance of undue concentration 
792 MicmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
Most, perhaps all, of those situations are inconsistent with what is 
perhaps the most fundamental principle of government procurement: 
that of getting the required goods at a decent price at the time desired. 44 
In each instance a policy objective is furthered at the expense of normal 
procurement goals. A third statement may, accordingly, be summarized 
in this fashion: certain firms may be denied contracts even if otherwise 
fully qualified and responsible, and other firms awarded those contracts, 
for reasons which are considered by Congress or the President or the 
buying agency to override normal procurement objectives. That, in 
operation, this may be inconsistent with the second statement made 
above has not seemed to trouble government officials unduly, including 
members of Congress. 
III. UNRESPONSIVE· Bms 
Another category may be made of those situations where the bidder 
is not responsive to the terms of the invitation for bids. This group 
involves only formally advertised procurements because defects in pro-
posals in response to the request for proposals by which negotiated 
procurements are begun may be cured during the process of negotiation. 
In contrast to the flexible negotiation procedures, in the formally 
advertised procurement situation the bidder must adhere rigidly to the 
terms of the invitation by the government to submit bids or lose out for 
not being "responsive." A fourth statement may be made, therefore, 
in this manner: those firms will be denied contracts which fail to abide 
by the requirements of the invitation for bids. And this is true even if 
the bidder makes an honest mistake or inadvertently overlooks some re-
quirement. Moreover, in event of mistake the result may be that the 
bidder will be held to the terms of his bid as made and that he will not 
be allowed to modify or withdraw it. 
Several situations illustrate the concept of unresponsiveness in 
bidding. First of all, a bid may fail to conform to the specifications 
desired. This means that the bidder must promise to deliver items 
of contracts in a few leading suppliers; (d) preservation of essential skilled labor forces; 
(e) utilization of existing open industrial capacity; (f) preservation of essential manage-
ment organization and know-how; and (g) a maximum degree of subcontracting. N.Y. 
T1MEs, Dec. 9, 1954, p. 1:7. See 31 Comp. Gen. 279 (1952). 
44 See J. P. Miller, "Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42 
AM. EcoN. REv., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS No. 2, p. 453 at 457-458 (May 1952), for 
a statement of the five major objectives of the military procurement program. Briefly, they 
are fulfillment of requirements, efficient production, budgetary economy, economic stabi-
lization, and socio-political objectives. 
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which are not materially at variance with the technical attributes of the 
required product. In a case, for instance, where the government wanted 
steel to conform to specification no. 352a and the bidder specified use 
of steel per specification no. 352, the Comptroller General ruled that 
award could not be made to the low bidder.45 
The cases where the bidder fails to conform to the required delivery 
date furnish a second example of an unresponsive bid. This applies 
only in procurements where time is of the essence. In those cases and 
where the invitation so specifies, a bid will not be considered unless 
delivery of the items is promised within the required time.46 
A third category is made up of cases where the bid does not con-
form to essential provisions of the invitation for bids. An example of 
this came in 1944 when, in reply to an invitation to bid on laundry 
services, the only bidder deleted the required Eight-Hour Law provision 
on the mistaken assumption that it had been suspended by the war 
emergency; the bid was accepted because it was the only bid and the 
services were urgently required. Nevertheless, the Comptroller General 
declared the contract to be invalid.47 
Still another situation authorizing rejection of the low bid as un-
responsive arises when improper restrictions or conditions are inserted 
in the bid of the company. (This situation clearly illustrates the non-
consensual nature of significant parts of government contracts: no 
deviation is allowed from the invitation to contract. A firm does busi-
ness on the government's terms or it does not get the award.) Such a 
restriction must, however, be of more than a minor nature; it must be 
of sufficient substance that "further orderly procedure is uncertain or 
impossible."48 An attempt by a firm to protect itself against such future 
changes in conditions as increased costs, or an attempt to limit its lia-
bility, or an attempt to shift the burden of risk to the government will 
all allow the contracting officer to reject low bids. The rationale is that 
to allow the imposition of such conditions would make the govern-
ment's obligation uncertain or indefinite and would be unfair to other 
bidders in that a contract accepting such conditions would not be the 
proposal offered to the other bidders. 
45 9 Comp. Gen. 24 (1929). See also 17 Comp. Gen. 554 (1938); 19 Comp. Gen. 
662 (1940); 30 Comp. Gen. 179 (1950). 
46 See Sequoia Mills v. United States, 60 Ct. CI. 985 (1925); 20 Comp. Gen. 4 
(1940); 34 Comp. Gen. 24 (1954); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 496 (1892). 
47 24 Comp. Gen. 376 (1944). 
48 E.g., 20 Comp. Gen. 216 (1940); 20 Comp. Gen. 4 (1940); 17 Comp. Gen. 864 
(1938); 15 Comp. Gen. 553 (1935). 
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IV. INELIGIBLE FIRMS 
Discussed above have been the situations which constitute the bulk 
of cases whereby firms seeking government contracts may be eliminated 
from competition. Another category exists, however, which involves 
relatively few would-be contractors but which has features raising some 
troublesome questions in administrative procedure. The following 
question indicates the nature of this category: to what extent may a . 
buying agency "blacklist" a business concern? That is to say, may a 
company be refused a contract for ethical reasons or because its integ-
rity is considered to be substandard? If so, what are the limitations on 
this power of disqualification? 
To begin with, it should be stated that federal buying agencies do 
exercise power to establish and maintain lists of firms to whom awards 
will not be inade--in other words, to blacklist. In what manner and 
under what criteria may such blacklisting be exercised? 
The term itself is a catch-all colloquialism not particularly descri~ 
tive of what in fact takes place when certain firms are disqualified from 
receiving a federal contract. In practice, the word is not used. Rather, 
the technical terms of "ineligibility," "debarment," and "suspension," 
all of which have more precise referents, are in common use. Although 
no definition of the latter words is to be found in statute or regulation, 
they refer to different activities under the procedure of disqualification 
of bidders. Distinctions between them may, on analysis, be more ap-
parent than real; nevertheless, they are used. An example appears in 
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, one part of which "pre-
scribes policies and procedures relating to the debarment of bidders ... , 
ineligibility of bidders . . . , and the suspension of bidders. . . ."49 
Finns "ineligible" to receive contracts include those found to have 
violated the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act/'0 the Davis-Bacon 
Act,51 or the Buy American Act,52 and those who do not qualify as 
"manufacturers" or "regular dealers" under the Walsh-Healey Act. 
Those "debarred" are firms convicted of fraud or other criminal offense 
in connection with a contract or convicted of a violation of the anti-
. trust laws. Those "suspended" are those who are suspected of having 
committed fraud or other criminal offense in connection with a contract. 
49 ASPR 1-600, reported at. IA CCH Govr. CoNTRAars RBP. ,J29,049A (1955). 
11049 Stat. L. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §35. 
5146 Stat. L. 1494 (1931), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §276a-2(a). 
5247 Stat. L. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §IOb(h). 
• 
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In short, business firms blacklisted fall into one of two general cate-
gories: those who have been convicted of violation or of a failure to 
observe some federal statute and those who are merely suspected of 
having committed such a violation or failure. Accordingly, a fifth state-
ment may be made: certain firms may be barred from obtaining-or, 
perhaps more importantly, from even being considered for-a federal 
contract where those firms have been convicted of a statutory violation 
or are suspected of having committed such a violation.58 
"The penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its imposition may 
destroy a going business."54 That being so, the procedure of how this 
action is taken and the question of whether the administrative proce-
dure should be changed seems to be worthy of comment in some detail. 
V. DEBARMENT AND INELIGIBILITY 
One of the sanctions imposed by Congress in order to insure adher-
ence to the Walsh-Healey, Davis-Bacon and Buy American Acts is the 
provision made in those statutes for disqualification of violators for a 
period of three years. One part of the Walsh-Healey Act directs the 
Comptroller General to distribute a list to all agencies containing the 
names of persons or firms found by the Secretary of Labor to have 
breached any of the agreements or representations required by that 
act.55 That statute, in addition, imposes the requirement of being a 
manufacturer or regular dealer on those firms desiring to contract with 
the federal government. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, violators are also 
listed by the Comptroller General after a similar determination by the 
Secretary of Labor. Buy American Act violators are similarly treated. 
In addition to the above-mentioned statutes, federal contractors may 
run afoul of another group of prohibitions imposed by the Secretary of 
Labor by regulation. Acting under authority delegated by Congress in 
58 Or are, for those contracts within the purview of the Walsh-Healey Act, determined 
by the Secretary of Labor to be neither a manufacturer nor a regular dealer. 
MATrY. GEN. COMM. ON An. Pnoc., DIVISION OF PuBuc CoNTRAC'l's 4 (1939) 
(mimeographed monograph). As of November 15, 1954, 20 business enterprises and 27 
individuals were barred under the Walsh-Healey Act, and 15 firms and 16 individuals 
under the Davis-Bacon Act. Pursuant to the Secretary of Labor's regulations, noted in note 
56 infra, as of November 15, 1954, five firms and one individual were on the ineligible 
list for violations of the Housing Act of 1949, and five firms and six individuals for viola-
tions of the Eight-Hour Law. Communication from the Assistant General Counsel, Gen-
eral Accounting Office, to the present writer, dated December 10, 1954. 
55 See Ball, ''Blacklisting Federal Contractors," 28 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 147 (1943), 
for a discussion of the early practice under the Walsh-Healey Act. See 3 CCH, LAB. LAw 
SERv. ,i26,108 (1953) for reports of decisions by the Labor Department. 
796 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, the Secretary of Labor has pro-
mulgated a set of standards, regulations, and procedures with respect 
to administration and enforcement by federal agencies of labor stand-
ards provisions applicable to contracts covering federally financed and 
assisted construction.56 Under these regulations, which have the same 
effect as a statute, firms found in willful or aggravated violation of any 
of eight federal statutes are treated in a fashion similar to those found 
to have violated the Walsh-Healey or Davis-Bacon Acts. 
No other express congressionally-approved provision exists for dis-
qualifying firms from getting federal contracts. However, administra-
tive regulations provide for disqualification in other instances. The key 
regulation here is that issued by the General Services Administration, 
entitled "Debarment of Bidders," which provides the basis for further 
disqualification action by both civilian and military agencies. The 
· regulation notes the aforementioned statutory disqualification, includ-
ing those imposed by the Secretary of Labor, and then provides as 
follows (§207.03): 
" ... Entry shall be made on the debarment and ineligible lists 
of lirms or individuals on the following bases: 
"d. Those the executive agency determines to debar adminis-
tratively for any of the causes and under all of the appropriate 
conditions listed in subsection 207.05."57 
Section 5 of the regulation authorizes debarment "in the public 
interest" for conviction of a criminal offense in obtaining or performing 
a government contract, conviction of violation of the antitrust laws 
arising out of submission of bids or proposals, a serious and willful 
failure to deliver on a previous contract or a history of unsatisfactory 
performance on previous contracts or violation of the contractual cove-
56 Published in the Federal Register at 16 FED. REG. 4430 (1951), 16 FED. REG. 
11592 (1951), and 17 FED. REG. 11593 (1952); codified at 29A C.F.R. (Supp. 1954) 
§5. For Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, see 15 FED. REG. 3176 (1950); 63 Stat. L. 
207 (1949), 5 u.s.c. (1952) §1332-15. 
The statutes concerned are (1) the Anti-Kickback Act; (2) the Eight-Hour Law; (3) 
the National Housing Act; (4) the Hospital Survey and Construction Act; (5) the Fed-
eral Airport Act; (6) the Housing Act of 1949; (7) the School Survey and Construction 
Act of 1950; (8) the Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act of 
1951. 'These statutes are cited in 29A C.F.R. (Supp. 1954) §5. 
57 GSA Reg. 1-II-207.00, issued Jan. 5, 1953, and amended by GSA General Regu-
lation No. 15, dated June 17, 1954. The text references are made to the regulation as 
amended. According to the letter (No. 1-11, Jan. 5, 1953) transmitting the regulation to 
the heads of federal agencies, approval was given to its promulgation by the Comptroller 
General of the United States. 
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nant against contingent fees, and debarment by some other federal 
agency. The military departments have followed the provisions of this 
regulation and provide for debarment in essentially the same terms as 
those listed. 
Restrictions applicable against contractors debarred by the military 
departments include those of not awarding contracts to or soliciting 
proposals from those firms, possible termination of existing contracts, 
and possible withholding of funds due under existing contracts. In 
addition, in those contracts where the government has reserved the 
right to approve subcontracts, the award of a subcontract to a debarred 
firm will be disapproved; in certain cases, this may include "second-tier" 
subcontracts, that is, sub-subcontracts. 
But both the General Services Administration's regulation and the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation provide certain administra-
tive safeguards which go far to prevent arbitrary or ill-considered action 
on the part of procurement officials. Provision is made in the regula-
tions for notification to the affected £rm of the action taken and an 
opportunity afforded to contest the determination administratively. An 
additional safeguard exists in the opportunity to ask the Comptroller 
General to intervene should the bid of a debarred contractor be rejected 
by a contracting officer. 
In cases, then, of both ineligibility and debarment, the procurement 
agencies have built-in administrative machinery which will prevent 
taking action in secret and which will give the affected concern a chance 
to know what it is faced with and to contest whatever charges there 
may be. The final category of blacklisted firms is, however, one where 
these procedural safeguards do not exist. 
VI. SUSPENSION OF CONTRACTORS 
The General Services Administration's regulation permits agencies 
to add additional names to the disqualified list: 
"Nothing in this section shall prevent any agency from sup-
plementing the consolidated list with names of firms or individ-
uals administratively determined to be included, in accordance 
with procedures established by such agency, for causes other than 
those specifically set forth herein, or from establishing such other 
lists as any agency, in its discretion, may elect to use."58 
58 GSA Reg. 1-II-207.08 Qan. 5, 1953). 
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It is upon this subsection that the military departments apparently 
rely for authority for the procedure of "suspending" firms suspected of 
having some species of fraud or other criminal act in connection with 
obtaining, attempting to obtain, or in the performance of a contract. 
According to the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, suspension 
is to be for "a temporary period pending the completion of investiga-
tion and such legal proceedings as may ensue." Restrictions to be 
placed upon the contractor during suspension include nonsolicitation 
of bids and proposals and possible termination of existing contracts, 
withholding of funds due on existing contracts, and the disapproval of 
subcontract awards to such firms. All of this•is to be done without noti-
fying the firm. 
By summary administrative action, then, which is taken without 
notice or hearing or opportunity either to know or to contest whatever 
evidence may motivate the action, a company is abruptly deprived of 
opportunities to bid, to be paid, or even to know what the trouble is. 
"A suspended Contractor will not be informed of the prohibitions 
effected against him," states the military regulation. 
But some recognition is given of the far-reaching effect of such 
action and procurement officials are admonished that suspension is "a 
drastic action which must be based upon adequate evidence rather than 
mere accusation" and that the placing of the name of a firm on the 
suspended list will be for "the purpose of protecting the interest of the 
Government and not for punishment." Some modification of the pro-
scriptions of the suspension policy are possible when it is determined 
that a modification would be to the government's interest.119 
That procedure raises several problems: (a) the source of the 
authority and the legal basis of suspension action; (b) relief, if any, 
availaole to a firm against whom suspension action has been taken; 
(c) whether the procedure as now in operation meets minimum stand-
ards of procedural due process; and (d) whether other procedures 
could be created to insure that the interests of the government are fully 
protected on the one hand and that full protection is accorded the 
individual business enterprise on the other. 
1 
119 ASPR I-600 through 1-609 contains not only the regulations for debarment but 
also for suspension. The quoted matter in the text is taken from these paragraphs. See IA 
CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP. ,r,r29,049A to 29,0491 (1954). 
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A. Authority for Suspension 
No express statutory authority exists for suspension action by the 
military procurement authorities. At no place in the Armed Services 
Procurement Act is there even recognition by Congress that summary 
action of that type may be taken. The legislative history is silent, 
although the Senate Report does contain language stating that a bidder's 
reputation may be evaluated in determining responsibility of bidders. 60 
No judicial decision directly on point has been found. However, the 
Comptroller General, ever-watchful guardian of the tax dollar, has 
stated that "as a general rule there is no authority for the debarment 
of bidders and all bids should be received and given consideration on 
an equal basis."61 Since suspension action is taken on the basis of 
unproved facts-on a suspicion, not a certainty, of irregularity-it 
would seem to be an a fortiori case that the Comptroller General would, 
in a proper case, likewise disapprove of suspension. (Not, be it noted, 
because of any desire to insure procedural due process, but to save 
Uncle Sam some money; apparently, it is dollars, not attempts to attain 
justice, which motivates that office.) 
The absence of either statutory or judicial authority for the power 
to suspend is not, of course, determinative of the question. It would 
take no farfetched reasoning to establish such a power on rather well-
founded grounds. In one sense the question is answered by a dictum 
in Perkins 11. Lukens Steel Company,62 the case upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Walsh-Healey Act. There the Supreme Court made 
this oft-quoted statement: "Like private individuals and businesses, 
the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own 
supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms 
and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." The Court 
then held that a contractor had no "standing" to contest an administra-
tive action by the Secretary of Labor. But suspension was not before 
60 "The question whether a particular bidder is a 'responsible bidder' requires sound 
business judgment, and involves an evaluation of the bidder's experience, facilities, techni-
cal organization, reputation, financial resources, and other factors. The service concerned 
with the procurement of goods of the type dealt in by the bidder is naturally best qualified 
to make this evaluation, and broad discretion is accordingly reserved to the service in this 
respect." S. Rep. 571, 80th Cong., 2d sess., July 16, 1947, published in 2 U.S. Code 
Cong. Serv. 1048 at 1064 (1948). 
61 7 Comp. Gen. 547 (1928). 
62 310 U.S. 113 at 127, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940). 
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the Court in that case, and its present validity has possibly been watered 
down by subsequent congressional action (see below). 
The Lukens Steel decision aside, a compelling case may be made 
for the proposition that suspension power is a necessary derivative from 
the power granted in the Armed Services Procurement Act to determine 
responsibility of bidders. In addition to the aforementioned Senate 
Report's reference to reputation in determining a bidder's responsibil-
ity, some recent fairly analogous case material is available. During 
World War II it was the practice of some of the emergency agencies, 
notably the Office of Price Administration (OPA) and the War Pro-
duction Board (WPB), to issue suspension orders for violations of war-
time rationing and material-allocation regulations. Such an order re-
sulted in making rationed articles unavailable to the violator, thus 
creating a most serious situation of depriving the violator of his means 
of livelihood. Many cases arose as a result of bitter controversy over 
the procedure, to be decided definitively in 1943 by the Supreme Court 
in L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. 11. Bowles.63 The action was one to enjoin 
enforcement of a suspension order by the OPA; the Court limited its 
decision to the narrow question of whether the statutory power to 
allocate materials included the power to issue suspension orders and to 
withhold rationed materials from established violators of ration regu-
lations. After noting that the administrative £nding of repeated viola-
tions was not challenged, the Court concluded that suspension orders 
could be issued, even though no statutory authority expressly gave that 
power. 
In like fashion, the congressional mandate to award contracts to 
"that responsible bidder whose bid is most advantageous to the gov-
ernment, price and other factors considered," of course carries with it 
the power to determine lack of responsibility. A suspension directive 
against a £rm is, in essence, such a determination. But it has ramifica-
tions beyond that type of determination and is far more serious than 
the normal determination of lack of responsibility. 
One considerably older Supreme Court case buttresses the view 
that a power to suspend exists: fo United States 11. Adams64 the Court 
held that the Secretary of War was legally correct in suspending pay-
ment on an existing contract until all of the facts were available to the 
paying officers and could be evaluated to ascertain the propriety of cer-
63 322 U.S. 398, 64 S.Ct. 1097 (1944). 
64 74 U.S. 463 (1868). 
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tain payments. Payment on the contract had been held up pending 
investigation of allegations of fraud committed by Army procurement 
officers and Adams. 
Before, however, power to suspend contractors suspected of fraud 
may be accorded a legal basis another hurdle must be overcome: 
whether suspension is "punitive" or "remedial" in nature. Although 
this is essentially a sterile inquiry, productive more of logic-chopping 
than meaningful insight into administrative practice, it is a question 
courts try to answer. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation is 
careful to point out that suspension "will be for the purposes of pro-
tecting the interest of the government and not for punishment," indi-
cating, perhaps, the concern of the drafters of that regulation for that 
legal hurdle. The doctrine involved has been stated in this fashion: 
"Administrative imposition of criminal penalties is . . . generally for-
bidden. But administrative imposition of civil or remedial penalties is 
commonplace. . . ."65 Here, again, the Steuart case provides some 
authoritative statements. There the Court rejected the £rm' s arguments 
that "suspension orders are penalties to which persons will not be sub-
jected unless the statute plainly imposes them" and denied that an 
order of suspension was a "means of punishment of an offender." 
Rather, the suspension order was designed "to protect the distribution 
system and the interests of conservation." In like fashion, present-day 
suspension of would-be contractors could be viewed not as punishment, 
but as a system designed to insure that the military procurement dollar 
is spent properly. 
But the Steuart case is not on all-fours with the suspension proce-
dures of the military departments. Perhaps more of a "right" is involved 
in being able to buy and sell commodities in the market than in selling 
to the government. In that case the administrative :finding of repeated 
violations of the regulations was not challenged on judicial review. 
Undoubtedly this factor played a large part in the Court's decision. 
Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate that the power of sus-
pension could be held to be within the power of the procurement 
officials. Whether that power is properly wielded is another question. 
B. Administrative Safeguards 
Assuming, then, that a suspension power exists, is it being con-
ducted with due regard to safeguards against arbitrary or mistaken 
65 DAVIS, AnMINisTRATIVE I.Aw 66 (1951). 
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administrative action? _ Is there any requirement for procedural due 
process standards to be adhered to in the determination of a suspension 
order? 
In the absence of congressional action, any due process require-
ments will, if they are erected at all, have to come from judicial action. 
Here at the very outset a formidable obstacle is met in the decision in 
the Lukens Steel case to the effect that those who would contract with 
the government lack "standing" to contest administrative action. 66 By 
way of dictum, the Court said that the government "enjoys the unre-
stricted power . . . to determine those with whom it will deal," and 
concluded that a firm claiming to be aggrieved by administrative action 
could not contest the action of the government in its proprietary capac-
ity. If the doctrine of that case is adhered to, then the result would be: 
summary administrative action, taken in camera without notice or op-
portunity to be heard, is beyond judicial relfef. That would be true 
even though, as the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
Procedure stated, "the penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its imper 
sition may destroy a going business." A strange doctrine, that, in a gov-
ernment supposedly of laws, not of men. 
. The rationale of the Lukens Steel case is based on a privilege-right 
dichotomy. Contracting with· the government was held to fall within 
the general class of interests called privileges, short of being a "legal 
right" for the protection of which judicial review is available. Having 
a privilege only, the contractor has no standing to sue since no legally 
protected interest is at stake. "Due process," it has been observed, "does 
not prevent the government from denying bounties or privileges with-
out a hearing. Just as one must have a sufficient 'interest' or must be 
in the technical sense 'aggrieved' or 'adversely affected' in order to 
obtain judicial review of administrative action, so one must have a 
legally recognized interest or right in order to be entitled to participate 
in an administrative proceeding."67 
The privilege-right antinomy and the basing of judicial relief on the 
pigeon-hole containing rights is scarcely a realistic approach to a com-
plex problem of administration. As has been stated by a leading con-
temporary commentator, an "applicant for ... a government contract, 
66 Cf. Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 914. 
67 DAVIS, AnMINISTRAnvE 1.Aw 246-247 (1951). Cf. ''Despite the unanimity and 
clarity of the Lukens Steel decision, one may still wonder whether a supplier of goods to 
the Government may never have standing to challenge such an administrative regulation." 
Id. at 682. 
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whose financial well-being may be wholly dependent on the govern-
ment grant, [should not be treated any differently than] one declared 
to be injured in his personal or property 'rights.' "68 The dominating 
influence of government purchases upon the American economy gen-
erally and upon individual business enterprises specifically makes the 
Lukens Steel doctrine unreal today. Power of life or death over a firm 
is within the hands of unrestrained administrative officials; that power, 
when used, involves more than the deprivation of a grant, benefit, or 
privilege in the traditional sense. 69 The "standing" doctrine, if it pre-
cludes effective redress for parties the object of suspension action, 
involves an economic favor of great importance in present-day America. 
"When the Government's purchases are so great that they dominate 
the entire economy, the implications of the Perkins decision with 
respect to unreviewable administrative power can hardly be over-
stated."70 The point is not whether the government has or does not 
have the power to deny award of contracts or whether the award of a 
contract is or is not a privilege. Rather, it is whether such privileges 
should be denied to individual business firms without the latter being 
afforded an opportunity to obtain a judicial decision on the legality or 
the propriety of such denials. "Absolute discretion," Justice Douglas 
once remarked, "like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of 
liberty."11 
At this juncture, it may be well to refer to recent legislation which 
at least limits, if not overturns, the Lukens Steel decision. In 1952 
Congress amended the Defense Production Act to provide in part for 
judicial review of certain determinations under the Walsh-Healey Act: 
"Notwithstanding the inclusion of any stipulations required 
by any provision of this Act in any contract subject to this Act, 
any interested person shall have the right of judicial review of any 
legal question which might otherwise be raised, including, but not 
limited to, wage determinations and the interpretation of the terms 
'I Ii ' ' gul d l ' ' f ' d ' k ' "7" oca ty, re ar ea er, manu acturer, an open mar et. -
68 SCHWARTZ, FRENcH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND nm CoMMoN-LAw WoRLD 159 
(1954). 
69 This was recognized by the Secretary of Labor early in the history of the adminis-
tration of the Walsh-Healey Act. That official reportedly was reluctant to invoke the black-
list provisions of the act since blacklisting might destroy a going business and thus defeat 
one of the purposes of the act by eliminating employment opportunities. Cf. CHAMBER-
LAIN, DoWLINo AND HAYs, Tm1 JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL AnMINISTRAnvE 
AoBNCIBS 107-109 (1942). 
70 Nathanson, "Central Issues of American Administrative Law," 45 AM.. PoL. Ser. 
REv. 348 at 373 (1951). 
11 In New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882 at 884, 72 S.Ct. 152 (1951). 
7266 Stat. L. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §43a(c). 
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Just what effect this legislation will have is not clear. Some indication, 
however, of the intent of Congress may be derived from the following 
statement by Senator Fulbright: "It is our purpose, by this amendment, 
to overturn that [Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.] decision."73 Does it give 
"standing" to contestants of administrative action on contracts? Within 
the field of the contracts covered by the Walsh-Healey Act, it seems 
clear that it does. It has been so held: in Covington Mills v. Durkin, · 
a case where a restraining order of a minimum wage determination was 
sought, the federal district court said that, despite the Lukens Steel 
case, the complainants "have a standing to sue for the simple reason 
that ... the Fulbright Amendment [provides for] ... the very kind 
of review they are seeking here."74 
If that is true, then how much validity does the Lukens Steel case 
have today? Apparently little so far as its precise holding is concerned, 
for Congress has overruled the Supreme Court. A great deal, perhaps, 
on the broader question of lack of standing and the consequent freedom 
of the· government to deny contracts. An example here is Atlantic 
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield where a motor carrier sought to 
enjoin issuance of a postage stamp commemorating the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad's 125th anniversary. In a per curiam opinion, the court, 
affirming and quoting the district court, said: "It is by now clear that 
neither damage nor. loss of income in consequence of the action of 
Government, which is not an invasion of recognized legal rights, is in 
itself a source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation 
recognizing it as such,"75 citing the Lukens Steel case. Although an 
argument could be made that Congress in the Fulbright Amendment 
indicated a preference against the latter case, it is probably safe to 
assume that the amendment will have but a limited application and 
will probably be confined entirely to Walsh-Healey determinations. 
Courts will probably continue to hew to the line of no standing, and 
will not create new concepts of judicial controversies in the public 
contract field. 
But in any event, adherence to a sterile privilege-right division is 
not helpful. Conceptualistic thinking seldom is helpful to understand-
ing, however convenient it may be. The test should not be what the 
73 98 CoNG. R:Ec. 6531 (1952). 
74 3 Pnrn & F1sCHER, ADMIN. LAw (2d ser.) 221 (D.C. D.C. 1953). This case has 
now been decided on the merits with the determination of the Secretary of Labor under 
the Walsh-Healey Act overturned by the federal district court. Covington Mills v. 
Mitchell, 23 U.S. Law Week 2510 (April 12, 1955). 
75 (D.C. Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 64. 
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Court in the Lukens Steel case leads one to believe: whether a con-
tractor or bidder on government contracts has a legal right or merely a 
privilege. Such an approach really assumes the answer in its mere 
statement of the problem. Rather, the issue is whether, in choosing 
those with whom it will do business, the government will be required 
to pay attention to those fundamental standards of fair play usually 
subsumed under the rubric of procedural due process. Roscoe Pound 
has said: 
"In administrative adjudication there is an obstinate tendency 
to decide without a hearing, or without hearing one of the parties, 
or after conference with one of the parties in the absence of the 
other, whose interests are adversely affected, or to treat the statu-
tory requirement of a hearing as a mere formality and act upon 
preformed opinions as to the order to be made. Another closely 
related tendency is to make determinations on the basis of reports 
not divulged, giving the party affected no opportunity to refute or 
explain. Another is to make determinations seriously affecting 
individual rights without a basis i.n evidence of rational probative 
force. Another no less widespread but not easy to reach under 
the statutes and procedure of today is to set up and give effect to 
policies beyond or even at variance with the statutes or the general 
law governing the action of the administrative agency."76 
This generalized indictment by Pound may or may not have gen-
eral application or may or may not be generally true. Quite possibly 
it is too severe. 77 But does it not have application to the specific case 
of suspensions of suspected contractors as carried out today? Much of 
what he says is true of the suspension procedure: there is no hearing; 
reports of investigation are not divulged; no explicit statutory authority 
exists for the procedure. More than that, the party affected is not even 
informed of the suspension until he finds a bid rejected or payments 
withheld, and even at that time he is not told of the nature of the 
charges against him, what he is believed to have done, or how long the 
suspension will last. A clearer case of administrative absolutism would 
be hard to imagine. As Bentham has remarked, "where there is no pub-
licity, there is no justice." 
76 Pound, ''The Challenge of the Administrative Process," 30 A.B.A.J. 121 at 123 
(1944). 
77 Certainly it was too severe for the specific matter Pound was discussing: OPA sus-
pension orders. Apparently he was writing under a mistaken view of the facts. See Field, 
''Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound," 30 A.B.A.J. 385 (1944). But 
see Smith, "Comment on Mr. Field's Reply for the OPA," 30 A.B.A.J. 390 (1944). 
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C. Suspension in World War II 
A comparison with the procedures set up during World War II 
controlling the issuance of suspension orders by the OPA and WPB 
indicates the scope of unchecked power presently resting in procure-
ment officers. In both of those wartime agencies scrupulous regard was 
paid to procedural safeguards so that the parties affected had every 
opportunity of notice, hearing, judicial review and the other due proc-
ess requirements. "In the use of the suspension power great care [was] 
taken by OPA to safeguard the individual from any injustice ... . "18 
Some difference of opinion may have existed at that time on the valid-
ity of that statement. But for present purposes it can be said that the 
OPA procedure seems a very model of fairness when compared to con-
tractor-suspension techniques which are based upon mere suspicion of 
irregularity. 
Similarly, the WPB took care to erect and maintain safeguards for 
individuals affected by suspension orders. Although there may not 
have been strict legal necessity for such action, the WPB, after issuing 
its first suspension order in 1941, took care to formalize and improve 
its technique so that the end of providing safeguards for the persons 
believed to be violating the priority regulations was furthered.19 The 
procedure included notice to the .alleged violator, a hearing conducted 
by a compliance commissioner, the power to compel attendance of wit-
nesses for both parties, written and oral arguments, and judicial review 
of any suspension order. 80 
D. Countervailing Considerations 
So much, then, for the case for a new procedure within the buying 
agency itself, one which would give the business enterprises affected 
an opportunity to be treated openly. Are there compelling arguments 
on the other side in support of the present method of operation? What 
can be said in favor of it? 
The arguments are two-fold: (a) those based on the technical legal 
argument that a contractor, present or would-be, has no standing to 
contest such action; the view is that the action of the government is 
proprietary in nature and subject to no inhibitions other than those 
self-imposed by statute or internal administrative directive; and (b) 
18 Field, ''Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound," 30 A.B.A.J. 385 
at 386 (1944). 
19 See O'Brian and Fleischmann, "The War Production Board Administrative Policies 
and Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. I (1944), for an account of the WPB procedure. 
so Id. at 50-54. 
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those based on the view that divulging the charges to the firm affected 
will in some manner operate both to prejudice or compromise whatever 
subsequent case the Department of Justice may have against the party 
and to place an undue burden on the procurement process. 
The technical legal argument will stand or fall on the present 
validity of the broad Lukens Steel doctrine. In addition to the Fulbright 
Amendment of 1952, some question may be raised as to whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act (AP A) has changed the situation. Defi-
nitive answer to this question appears to be shrouded in doubt. Two 
problems are implicit in the question: are the military departments sub-
ject to the AP A, and does section l O of the AP A change prior doctrine 
on judicial review? 
On the first problem, the short answer is that the APA does apply 
to the military establishment, except as noted in the AP A itself, for the 
reason that the AP A is designed to apply to agencies in a functional 
manner. Specific agencies, as such, are not exempted; the act "was 
intended to apply to the entire executive branch of the Federal Gov-
ernment."81 Exceptions to its coverage have been drawn functionally, 
not with the idea of placing entire agencies beyond its reach. "The Act 
is comprehensive in scope and in terms applies to the executive and all 
administrative agencies, but exceptions are provided for as to certain 
types of functions. Thus, for example, while there is no exemption 
under the Act for the War and Navy Departments as such, Section 
2(a) exempts courts-martial, military commissions, and military or 
naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied 
territory."82 The legislative history and recent judicial decisions back 
up this conclusion. "[I]t has been the undeviating policy to deal with 
types of functions as such and in no case with administrative agencies 
by name. Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, but 
not the War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other 
functions."83 In Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit said in the course of holding that the War De-
partment was a federal agency, "The authority to act with the sanction 
of government behind it determines whether or not a governmental 
agency exists. The form the agency takes, or the function it performs 
are not determinative of the question of whether it is an agency .... "84 
81 Schwartz, ''The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation," 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. 
REv. 1173 at 1175 (1954). 
82 VANDERBILT, THE DoC'l'RlNE OF THE SEPARATION oF PoWERs AND lTs PRESENT-
DAY SrcNIFrCANcB 87 (1953). 
83 ADMINisTRA'I'IVB PROCEDURE Ac:r, LncrsLATIVB HrsTORY, S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 
2d sess., p. 191 (1946). 
84 (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 984 at 991. 
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So much, then, for the applicability of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: it would appear that at least the "housekeeping" functions 
of the military departments are within its purview. Does the act change 
the no-standing doctrine? 
Section IO(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act gives standing 
to "any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of 
any relevant statute .... "85 One view of the meaning of this provision 
is that it "undoubtedly adds nothing to the law."86 A recent case but-
tresses this view: in Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp.,87 the plain-
tiff was the low bidder on a contract to construct a hospital but the 
award went to the next highest bidder. The district court dismissed 
the action while asserting that even though plaintiff might have suffered 
grievous harm, the Administrative Procedure Act did not create rights 
but merely conferred jurisdiction to review discretionary acts of agen-
cies which affect existing statutory rights. If, then, section IO(a) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act merely restates prior law, it would 
appear to be clear that suspension would not be susceptible to judicial 
review. 
The other reason for not disclosing the situation to the party af-
fected-possible prejudice to a later legal action by the Department of 
Justice-does not hold water. In the £.rst place, it is hardly a sound 
argument to say that fair play may be dispensed with in order to build 
up a possible criminal or civil action. The very genius of the Ameri-
can legal system is against such procedure. Perhaps an even more 
compelling argument may be made by comparing again the OPA and 
WPB wartime procedure. In both of those agencies, criminal sanc-
tions were applicable to violations of the statutes; but this was not 
deemed of sufficient importance to prohibit holding hearings. In 
WPB suspension hearings, the hearing officer had the following al-
ternatives open to him: he could close the case, recommend submission 
to the Department of Justice for criminal or civil action or recom-
mend issuance of a suspension order. As of October 1, 1944, some 
1500 compliance hearings had been held, with 430 cases referred to 
the Department of Justice for action.88 It would seem to be clear 
85 60 Stat. L. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §l009(a). 
86 Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 670 at 690 (1947). 
s1 (D.C. Pa. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 961. But cf. American President Lines v. FMB, 
(D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 346. 
88 O'Brian and Fleischmann, "The War Production Board Administrative Policies and 
Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 1 at 51 (1944). 
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that administrative secrecy is not a necessary prerequisite to successful 
prosecution. 
At best, then, the argument in favor of secrecy and lack of hear-
ing rests on technical legal grounds. No compelling policy argument 
is in favor of it, other than possible delay in the procurement process 
with attendant confusion and harm to the national defense effort. 
That type of argument swayed the Court in the Lukens Steel case: 
"Courts should not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchas-
ing agencies of Government to the delays necessarily incident to 
judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sellers, which would be 
contrary to traditional government practice and would create a new 
concept of judicial controversies. A like restraint applied to purchas-
ing by private business would be widely condemned as an intolerable 
business handicap. It is . . . essential to the even and expeditious 
functioning of Government that the administration of the purchasing 
machinery be unhampered."80 But does not such a view make too 
much of expediency and efficiency? Equally, it would be more efficient 
for many governmental activities now subject to court review to be un-
hampered by judical scrutiny, but that is scarcely an argument for 
doing away with the machinery of judicial review or the underlying 
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. The self-limitation 
may indicate too great a deference to the procurement expert. 0° Fur-
thermore, it is doubtful that an undue delay would eventuate should 
suspension procedures be changed. 
E. A Fair Procedure 
In any event, alleged delay is more of an argument against judicial 
intervention than it is against an administrative hearing of the nature 
provided for by the APA. If true in purchasing, why would not the 
same argument prevail in priority and materials allocations during time 
of war? Apparently no adverse effect was noted by either the OPA or 
WPB of a type which would make unsuitable an administrative hear-
ing and judicial review. A delay argument may be an example of what 
89 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 at 130, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940). 
90 For a discussion of modern judicial deference to the executive branch in the fields 
of public employment, treatment of aliens and the postal service, see McCloskey, "The 
McCarran Act and the Doctrine of Arbitrary Power" in PuBLIC POLICY: A YEARBOOK OP 
nm GRADUATE ScHooL oP PUBLIC .An:MINisTRAnoN, HAnvARD UNIVERSITY 228 (1953). 
And for a trenchant criticism of the doctrine of the Lukens Steel case, see Davis, ''Ume-
viewable Administrative Action," 15 F.R.D. 411 at 421 et seq. (1954). 
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Justice Frankfurter noted in another case, that of "conjuring up hor-
rible possibilities that never happen in the real world .... "91 
A fair-play requirement would be one calling not so much for 
judicial review as for procedural safeguards within the agency itself. 
Probably the ordinary channels of judicial review of administrative 
action, i.e., consideration of the validity of the action in an enforce-
ment proceeding or in a suit brought by a party to enjoin enforcement, 
would not be satisfactory. That could delay procurement; certain it is 
that obtaining military requirements should not be held up, if held up 
in fact they would be, pending the outcome of the usually slow-moving 
judicial process. 
Necessary instead is some sort of administrative procedure which 
would allow firms in question to have notice of the charges, to appear 
and to present evidence, to question witnesses, and to enjoy other pro-
cedural safeguards. No delay would necessarily accompany such a 
system. Such a procedural requirement could be set up with the 
recognition that denials of the contracting privilege is really a penalty 
in fact, and a most drastic one, when financial life is at stake, and, 
as presently carried out, is punishment before conviction. Even the 
WPB suspension orders were recognized to have a punitive aspect: 
"there is unquestionably an incidental punitive element in the pro-
posed [suspension] action .... "92 This is particularly true when sus-
pension runs on for months, even years; the longer it remains in force 
the more drastic the impact upon the firm itself.93 The impact is both 
financial in losing out on government business and in the firm's repu-
tation: the knowledge that a company is "in bad" with the government 
becomes known and has a deleterious effect on the firm's reputation, 
good will and credit standing. 
91New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 at 583, 66 S.Ct. 310 (1946). 
92 O'Brian and Fleischmann, ''The War Production Board Administrative Policies and 
Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. Rllv. 1 at 49 (1944). See also Am. GEN. CoMM. ON 
Ao. Pnoc., DIVISION OF Ptmuc CoNTRAcrs 4 (1939): ''The withholding of government 
business may be an exceedingly drastic, if not altogether ruinous penalty." 
93 For an account of the handling of one suspended fum by the Department of the 
Army, see Senate Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small Busi-
ness, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), entitled: "Participation of Small Business in Military 
Procurement." At pages 1 through 91 of that document, and particularly at pages 73-77, 
is testimony from Army officials about a fum first suspended on November 1, 1951; while 
the suspension was modified later, apparently the firm was still suspended on November 
20, 1952, when the Department of Justice notified the Army that the case was being closed 
without action in the Criminal Division. It should be noted that testimony such as this 
is vecy rare. Normally, information about suspended contractors is classified and closely 
guarded. See ASPR 1-601.3, IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP. 1129,049B (1954). For 
a subsequent development of this suspension action, see 34 Comp. Gen. 180 (1954). 
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Or the procedural requirement could be established with the recog-
nition that a :6.rm has a legal right at least to be considered for govern-
ment contract awards and to be treated fairly, even if there is no legal 
right to obtain a contract. No one would seriously argue that a legal 
right to receive contracts exists or should exist. But it can be argued 
in persuasive terms that a firm should not be deprived of the opportu-
nity to be considered for contract-award without elementary due proc-
ess requirements being followed. 
"Law has reached its £.nest moments when it has freed man from 
the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, 
some bureaucrat. Where discretion is absolute, man has always suf-
fered."94 Here, then, is an opportunity for law to exprience one of 
those moments. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
An examination has been made in general terms of occasions when 
federal procurement officials may refuse to do business with would-be 
contractors. Special emphasis has been placed upon the procedure of 
suspending firms suspected of irregular dealings, since that procedure 
raises some important questions in administrative law. 
In 1940 the Supreme Court stated clearly that the federal govern-
ment enjoys an unrestricted power to set the terms and conditions upon 
which it will do business and to choose those with whom it would 
contract. But even if that statement is presently valid, it still does not 
give the individual procurement officer unfettered freedom of choice 
of contractor. Congress, the President, the courts and the Comptroller 
General have all imposed inhibitions upon that freedom. In addition, 
the procurement officer's agency regulations both refine the externally-
94 Justice Douglas in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 at 101, 72 S.Ct. 154 
(1951). It appears to be meet to quote additional language from Justice Douglas' dis-
senting opinion: 
" ••• Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than 
any of man's other inventions. 
"The instant case reveals only a minor facet of the agelong struggle. The result 
reached by the Court can be rationalized or made plausible by casting it in terms of contract 
law: the parties need not have made this contract; those who contract with the Govern-
ment must turn square comers; the parties will be left where their engagement brought 
them. And it may be that in this case the equities are with the Government, not with the 
contractor. But the rule we announce has wide application and a devastating effect. It 
makes a tyrant out of every contracting officer. He is granted the power of a tyrant even 
though he is stubborn, perverse or captious. He is allowed the power of a tyrant though 
he is incompetent or negligent. He has the power of life and death over a private business 
even though his decision is grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected." 
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imposed proscriptions and add new limitations on his freedom and the 
exercise of his autliority. 
Blacklists developed under statutory warrant have administrative 
safeguards designed to prevent arbitrary action. But nonstatutory black-
listing-suspension-is conducted in secret, in the absence of any such 
safeguards. A strong and perhaps compelling argument can be made 
for a change in suspension procedures leading toward the prevention 
of possible arbitrary action. 
